第159章 Chapter VI(23)

Thus,though we are only entitled to hope as to the government of the world and a life after death,the bare hope may have a beneficial effect.'It makes life and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings,and gives greater strength and solemnity to all the sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow-creatures and mankind at large.'Aspirations are no longer checked by the disastrous feeling of 'not worth while.'Religion,too,has at before us a 'Divine Person,as a standard of excellence and a model for imitation.'(157)The ideal,it is true,would remain,even if the person were held to be imaginary;and would not be encumbered by theological difficulties.Yet there is an advantage in the belief that a perfect being really exists and represents the ruler of the universe,which cannot be shared by the rationalist.(158)Hence as,after all,the truth of the belief is possible,it may be combined with the Religion of Humanity.That religion,'with or without supernatural sanctions,'will be the religion of the future;but it will be strengthened by the feeling that we are 'helping God'and supplying 'cooperation'which 'he,not being omnipotent,really needs.'(159)Truly,Mill was nearly qualified for a place among the prophets.

Mill's arbitrary assumptions,like the metaphysical wire drawings of Mansel,are rather unprofitable in themselves:few people will care to follow them in detail;and neither could boast of many converts.Believers soon became aware of the real scepticism of Mansel's position;and positivists saw that Mill left an opening for superstition.Both Mansel and Mill were troubled about the Religion of Nature.It is abundantly clear,as Mill might have foreseen,that such a theology as he contemplates could be of no real value.It depends essentially upon compromises and arbitrary distinctions.It is still within the sphere of science,though doomed to disappear as science advances,and from the first is inconsistent with the very aims which are proposed by theology.God is admittedly not omnipotent,and his existence is no guarantee for morality or optimism.And hence there is an odd approximation between Mill and Mansel.

Mill observes(160)that the moral character of an alleged revelation cannot be of itself a proof of its divinity.The importance of the 'internal evidence'is therefore 'principally negative.'So says Mansel.'The evidence derived from the internal character of a religion,whatever may be its value within its proper limits,is,as regards the divine origin of the religion,purely negative.'(161)Where is the difference?If the morality of a revelation be bad,Mill argues that the revelation must be at once rejected.Mansel thinks that although the morality be not clearly good,it may in some way represent a divine command.Immoral laws cannot be divine,says Mill,though a good law may be human.A law apparently bad,replies Mansel,may be divine,though,of course,the badness can only be apparent.Here,as elsewhere,the believer in the empirical character of morality appears to attribute most certainty to the moral judgment.The solutions differ accordingly.Mill supposes that God must be good,but reconciles this to facts by assuming that God is not all-powerful.Mansel will not give up the power,and to preserve the goodness has to assume a radical incapacity in the intellect --a necessity of believing where there is an impotence of conceiving.Mill,that is,is content with the empirical deity,who is necessarily limited;and Mansel keeps the deity of ontology but admits that he cannot be known.Mill's conception is purely arbitrary,though he keeps within the limits of conceivable experience;while Mansel preserves the language appropriate to the conception of absolute unity,and yet admits that it can mean nothing for us.'Agnosticism'seems to be an easier and more rational alternative;if it means an open admission that we know nothing,when we can only save our appearance of knowledge by arbitrary assumptions or by the use of meaningless words.Of Mill's position it must be frankly admitted that his desire for a religious and even supernatural belief is a proof of dissatisfaction with his own position.He felt here,as elsewhere,that something was wanting in his philosophy.What that really was may partly appear by considering other contemporary solutions.Mansel represents a particular phase of thought which is already extinct,and views differing both from theirs and from Mill's had in practice a far wider influence than either.

The Utilitarian view naturally identifies a religious creed with a belief in certain historical statements of fact.If the facts be provable the religion is true;if disproved it is false.

If there was such a being as Jehovah,it was desirable to worship him;and the creed would then be useful.If there was no such being,worship was folly.The test of the utility of a religion was,therefore,simply the truth or falsehood of its historical statements.If its gods were made by the fancy,not by the reason,the result is a condemnation of religion in general.That is simple and logical,and recognises an indisputable truth.So far as a religion makes false statements,they must be abandoned;and so far as its influence depends upon the falsity,it is pernicious.