第156章 Chapter VI(20)

Having rejected the metaphysical arguments for a Deity,we reach at last,says Mill,an argument of a really scientific character --the argument,namely,from design.(137)That is to say,he tries to find room for an empirical deity who must therefore correspond to a part of nature,not to the whole.He does not hold that the knowledge of nature anywhere involves antinomies or contrary inconceivables.It is a coherent and throughout intelligible system,but it would correspond to the ideal of completed science,not to any metaphysical belief.

Within this system there is room for a being who,though he is limited by something external to himself,may yet be an object of worship.In fact,there can be no a priori objection to the theory of a powerful being,who may be discovered,like any other beings known to us,by his action in particular cases.

Metaphysicians may decline to call such a being God;but a proof of super-human wisdom and power may be enough for practical purposes.(138)The proof,then,that such a being exists,must be made by induction;and,as Mill explains,by the first of the famous 'four methods,'namely,by that of Agreement.(139)This argument,though generally the weakest,is in this case 'strong of its kind.'He illustrates it by the familiar case.The eye is a complex structure which,as it began in time,must have had a cause or causes.'Chance'is eliminated by the number of instances,and therefore there must be some causal connection between the 'cause'which brought the elements together and the 'fact of sight.'Mill,that is,thinks it necessary to prove what science takes for granted.No man of science disputes that there is some cause of eyes and of every eye.But here we have the curious transition into another order of thought,which corresponds to the passage from the empirical to the transcendental meaning.It is clear that so long as we are in the sphere of science,the only 'cause'of the existence of an eye is the sum of the preceding organic processes.A given animal has eyes because the processes of reproduction involve resemblance to its parents.If we go back to eyeless ancestors,we have the problem how eyes were developed;but the purely scientific answer would still consist in assigning the previous conditions or the precedent stage in the whole process of nature.How do we get out of this series?The argument,according to Mill,would proceed by saying that,as sight follows the eye,the cause must be a 'final'cause;or,in other words,correspond to an 'intelligent Will.'But what is the relation of this Will to the admitted series of events?Causation always sends me back along an indefinitely producible series.Am I to interpret this cause as an 'alternative'to what may be called the natural cause;or as corresponding to a general power,which is manifested through the whole series?In the latter case we may consider the God of nature as an 'immanent'power.His operation is manifest in the general wisdom of the whole system.It is not only consistent with,but implies,the persistence of the 'laws of nature,'and therefore the evolution of eyes,if there was a period before eyes existed.If that view be tenable,we may save 'teleology'by applying it to nature as a whole,but there is no intervention in the actual series of natural events.On the view which Mill accepts,we have an intervention,at some particular point.But how is this to be inferred,or what can it mean?I have already noticed the familiar difficulties in speaking of 'Philip Beauchamp.'The philosophical objection is clear,(140)and in science 'creation'can be only a word;it introduces an arbitrary and unmeaning interruption,and,under the form of explaining,declares explanation to be impossible.

In fact,when such conceptions are brought into the argument,when 'creation'is used as an alternative hypothesis to a permanent order,the answer of the evolutionist is conclusive.

Here,accordingly,Mill finds himself confronted by Darwin.He admits that the doctrine of the 'survival of the fittest'would 'greatly attenuate,'though it would be in 'no way whatever inconsistent with creation.'(141)This means,apparently,that Darwinism does not prove that there was not a 'creation'at some indefinite time;though it does show that there is no need for supposing a creation since the existing order began.

I have already noticed Mill's view of this 'remarkable speculation.'Here he virtually admits that his theology,such as it is,and,indeed,his whole conception of nature,is virtually opposed to evolution.Science,he says,most truly,leads us to regard nature as 'one connected system,not a web of separate threads in passive juxtaposition with one another,but rather,like the human or animal frame,'in perpetual 'action and reaction';and the natural version of this,he adds,is theism.