第147章 Chapter VI(11)

Discussions such as I have touched often seem to be little more than a display of dialectical skill.Hamilton and Mill probably believed equally and in the same sense in the reality of Edinburgh or London.When a belief is admitted,the question why we believe is of interest chiefly in so far as the answer may give canons applicable to really disputable questions.Now the application of Hamilton's theories to theology certainly involved issues in regard to which men generally suppose themselves to be profoundly interested.We clearly believe in an 'external world,'whatever precisely we mean by it.But do we believe in God?or,if we believe,what precisely is meant by believing in God?That is a problem upon which turn all the most important controversies which have divided men in all ages --and the controversy which now raged over Hamilton's theory between Mill and Mansel corresponded to vital issues.Hamilton's essential position was given in the famous Cousin article in 1830.He frequently repeats,but he never much modifies or develops the argument.In the course of lectures repeated for twenty years,he divides his subject into three departments:'empirical psychology'and 'rational psychology';or the facts and laws of consciousness;and thirdly,'ontology,'which was to deal with the ideas of God,the soul,and so forth.(74)This third department was never written;and though We may guess at its general nature,his doctrine is chiefly indicated by his criticism of Cousin.

One result is unfortunate.I doubt whether so many sayings capable of different interpretations were ever brought together in the same space.The art of writing about 'ontology'is,it would seem,to disguise a self-evident truism by pompous phrases till the words are vague enough to allow the introduction of paradoxical meaning.Schelling and Cousin between them had provided a sounding terminology;and Hamilton,though his main purpose is to show that these fine phrases were only phrases,takes them up,tosses them about as if they had a real meaning,and leaves us in some doubt how far he is merely using the words to show their emptiness,or suggesting that,when the bubbles are burst,there is still some residuum of solid matter.'The unconditioned,'he says (giving his own view),'is incognisable and inconceivable.'(75)What,then,is 'the unconditioned'?

'The Unconditioned is the genus of which the Infinite and the Absolute are species.'(76)These technical phrases are the balls with which the metaphysical juggler plays his tricks till we are reduced to hopeless confusion.Mill gives the straightforward and,I think,conclusive criticism.(77)What is the sense of talking about 'The Absolute'or 'The Infinite'as hypostatised abstractions?Apply the epithets to concrete things or persons and we may understand what is really meant.A predicate going about at large cannot be really grasped;and the discussion would only be relevant if we were speaking of something which is absolute and nothing but absolute.The words themselves have meanings which become different when they are parts of different assertions.'Inconceivable'is a word which varies from self-contradictory to mere difficulty of imagining.'Absolute,'according to Hamilton,has two chief meanings,one of which is not opposed to the Infinite and the other contradictory of the Infinite.Mansel takes Mill to task for not seeing that Hamilton uses the word in two 'distinct and even contradictory senses,'and for not perceiving which meaning is implied in which cases.(78)It may be very wrong of Mill,but Hamilton's practice is certainly confusing.There is Cousin's 'Absolute'and Hamilton's 'Absolute'and Mansel's own 'Absolute';(79)and the difference is to be inferred from the nature of the argument.

There is a false Infinite and a true Infinite;and this suggests another difficulty.The obvious 'contradictory'of infinite is finite;but words cannot be really contradictory at all till they form part of a proposition.It is contradictory to call a thing finite and infinite in the same sense;but,if we admit of infinite divisibility,a thing must be at once infinite in comparison with an infinitesimal,finite in relation to other things,and infinitesimal in relation to those which in relation to it are infinite.Some words,again,refer to our knowledge of things,and are meaningless when predicated of objects.A fact may be 'certain'to me and only 'probable'to you,simply because the probability to each depends upon the evidence which he possesses.When this is supposed to correspond to some difference in the facts themselves,endless fallacies are produced.'The certain'is contradictory of the 'uncertain';but a given fact may be both 'certain'and 'uncertain.'A discussion naturally becomes perplexed,which is really treating a question of logic in terms appropriate to a question of fact.

I will not attempt to follow a controversy so perplexed in itself and in which the antagonists seem to be normally at cross purposes.I must try to bring out the main issue which is obscured by the singular confusions of the contest;and to this there seems to be a simple clue.Hamilton's theory is admittedly a 'modification of that of Kant,'(80)and intended to eliminate the inconsistency by which Kant had left an opening for the systems of Schelling and Hegel.Now Kant's famous argument,given in the Critique of Pure Reason,is a most crabbed piece of writing.It makes an English reader long for David Hume.Still,beneath its elaborate panoply of logical technicalities,it contains a very clear and cogent argument,which gives the real difficulty and which is strangely distorted by Hamilton.